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AS TRACT
This thesis is mainly concerned with studying the Process
perspective in Acquisitions. The basic premise is that the Process
itself impacts the outcome of Acquisitions in addition to the
traditionally understood impacts of "strategic" variables and
"organizational" variables.
There are four chapters in the thesis. Chapter 1 is a
commentary on the available evidence on the Acquisition Process.
While the research is by no means exhaustive, the principal view-
points are highlighted. The main point brought out here is that
there is a lot of prescriptive information or. "how acquisitions
should work" as opposed to descriptive evidence on "how acquisitions
actually work" in specific companies.
Chapter 2 outlines a generalized framework for studying the
Acquisition Process in any acquisitive company. This chapter
delineates the basic Research Questions that are considered
important in the Study of the Acquisition Process in specific
companies.
Chapter 3 describes the process in two major companies, A and
B. Their identities are masked to preserve confidentiality. The
level of detail in this chapter is only constrained by the extent of
information available. All possible evidence revealed to the author
is documented in this chapter.
Chapter 4 attempts to analyze the company information and
deduce certain Process generalizations. While it is understood that
a sample of two companies is insufficient for broad generalizations,
the analysis helps to highlight and clarify the role of various
issues that affect the Acquisition Process in the two companies.
Thesis Supervisor: Raymond Alain-Thietart
Title: Visiting Professor of Management
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. OVERVIEW OF DIVERSIFICATION, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Over the last twenty five years a number of companies have
diversified --mainly through acquisitions-- as an answer to the need
for corporate growth. Many reasons have been given for this
phenomenon. These include the need to:
- alleviate a slowdown in sales and earnings that come with
maturity
- build on an existing franchise
- react to competitive pressures forcing moves into new
product/markets
- avoid takeovers attempts
- attract and retain new managerial talent, react to anti-trust
laws, etc.l
"Mergers provide an important part of the market for corporate
assets and contribute to making capital markets efficient".2 They
are considered a means whereby entrepreneurs are rewarded for their
success, investment capital flows into areas of the economy where it
is needed, poor managers of publicly (and privately) held companies
are displaced and capital formation is encouraged thereby lowering
the risks associated with supplying capital to small and medium sized
businesses.3 The basic motivation for any acquisition or merger is
that the sum of the joint entity is expected to be worth more than
the individual parts. This so-called "synergy' has been referred to
-8-
as the "2 + 2 = 5" effect. One of the major difficulties in any
case is measuring whether these "synergy effects" have actually been
borne out in practice.
Diversification can be classified as related or unrelated.5
The relatedness issue is based on the perception of the operating
managers of the diversifying company. Diversification is considered
related if it:
- Involves businesses serving similar markets and/or using
similar distribution systems.
- Involves businesses using parallel or similar production
technologies.
- Involves businesses utilizing similar science-based research.
- Involves businesses operating at different points of the same
value-added chain.
If these conditions are not operant, i.e. if the diversification is
into businesses not falling into any of the above four categories,
then it is considered unrelated. Table 1-1 provides a brief capsule
of the potential benefits of the two major forms of diversification.
This thesis is primarily concerned with related diversification of
companies through the acquisition of other companies.
2. WHY STUDY THE ACQUISITION PROCESS?
Pre-acquisition analysis whether done internally within the
company or aided by outside consultants has traditionally focussed
on two issues6:
- strategic fit
- organizational fit
-9-
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The notion of strategic fit suggests that the acquiring company
is fundamentally interested in how the selling company will augment
its financial outlook. It suggests that the acquiring company has a
clean-cut strategy for acquisitions and that through a careful
analytical study of the selling company's finances, goals, industry,
markets, customers, etc., rational conclusions can be reached on
whether there is a "strategic fit" between the entities. Based on
this, the acquiring company can decide whether or not to acquire the
selling company. Most of the literature on this
subject 7 , 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 directly or indirectly seem to suggest
that sound strategic (mainly economic) analysis can lead to sound
acquisition decisions, because of perceived or calculated synergies.
1 3
Organizational fit issues can be defined as issues
concerned mainly with post-acquisition integration. Given different
planning and control systems, organizational culture and management
style in the selling company (vis-a-vis the acquiring company) there
are bound to be difficulties in meshing the two operations together.
A number of papers and articles have dwelt on different topics on
this subject, either in generality through the usage of specific case
studies. The topics include:
- Quality and skills of management talent, management
relationships and plans and controls.1 4
- Fear of a takeover in the target company.l5
- Corporate culture shock, especially associated with the
acquisition of high-technology companies by large
corporations in mature industries.l6 This article in
particular, suggests the possible need to allow the selling
-11-
company to function independently at least in the immediate
post-acquisition period, in order to aid the integration
process.
- The need for a "temperamental" fit between companies as a
criteria for acquisition success.17
- The problems of post-merger management that may lead to only
partial success of the acquisition. 18
- The management of the human side of acquisitions in both pre
and post acquisition phases and its impact on acquisition
success. 1 9 , 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 Motives, attitudes and
other human issues have been dealt with in detail in these
articles. Comprehensive research on the need for extensive
evaluation of Human Resources in pre-merger and acquisition
analysis has been done by Sadick.2 5
In spite of the evidence that acquiring companies are doing a
lot of homework in order to ensure strategic and organizational
comparability, the fact remains that a number of acquisition outcomes
are "disappointing"26 This may partly be due to the fact that
until recently, strategic fit considerations dominated the thinking
of acquisition-minded companies. Post-acquisition integration
questions had essentially taken a back-seat in most acquisitions.
The third dimension that companies usually may not actively consider
as a factor contributing to the ultimate success of any acqusition
strategy is the Process itself.2 7 This is the process of
analyzing, negotiating, acquiring and integrating the selling
company.
-12-
The aim of this thesis is to study the acquisition process in
two specific companies in order to see how they formulate and
implement their acquisition strategy. Process variables are exposed
in order to explore their individual roles and impact on the
acquisitions. Specific case histories wherever available are
reconstructed from company records in order to assess personality and
timing issues. Chapter 2 discusses the framework for analysis and
introduces the two companies involved in the study. The company
identities have been masked in order to preserve the confidentiality
of the information received by this author.
Chapter 3 describes the Acquisition Process in the two
companies. Information on the Process were drawn from three sources:
- Company records on specific acquisitions, wherever available.
- Informal interviews with senior acquisition specialists in
the companies, both on general acquisition strategy and
information on specific acquisitions.
- Publicly available articles, etc.
Chapter 4 concerns itself with drawing inferences from the
findings in the two companies. Future research directions are also
indicated here.
3. AVAILABLE LITERATURE ON THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
What should constitute the Acquisition Process has been written
about in varied forms in the literature. These relate to functions
and roles and operating modes within organizations. Table 1-2
suggests alternate operating modes for the Acquisition Process as
envisioned by Bradley and Korn.
-13-
Rochelle O'Conner's2 8 overview of the Acquisition Process
includes the following step by step procedure:
- Preliminary Market Research
- Development of Criteria for Acceptance of Candidates
- Identification of Candidates
- Initial Contact With Prime Candidates
- Detailed Information Collection
- Financial and Market Analysis
- Negotiation of Agreement in Principle
- Confirmation Studies
- Closure
Prescriptive literature also has an acquisition protocol
suggested by Robert N. Mueller. 9 He too classifies an acquisition
as being a rational step-by-step procedure. The various stages that
he envisions are:
- A Determinative stage, to clarify and state objectives and
determine top management and board commitment.
- A Scouting stage for potential candidates and preliminary
assessment of fit.
- A Consultation stage with outside parties such as
consultants, investment bankers, etc.
- A Strategic stage when strategic, indepth analysis of the
selling company (may encompass a set of several potential
candidates at any given time) is done.
- A Sensor stage when "interest" is gauged in the selling
company (or companies) being investigated.
-14-
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- A Vamp stage for the actual "lovemaking" between the
entities involved alongwith regulatory notices and approvals.
- A Proposal stage to the selling company.
- A Deal stage when the acquisition is executed and
personalities involved get to know each other much better.
- A post-acquisition Management stage, after the acquisition.
Table 1-3 shows an example of the typical functional roles at
various stages of the Acquisition Process.
Other prescriptive literature includes Baumer and Northhart3 0
31
and Gussow . These deal mostly with strategic issues to be
considered in the process alongwith a recognition of the
"negotiation" and "personality" variables involved. Both use a
plethora of examples from previous mergers and acquisitions.
Mace and Montgomery32 suggest that apart from strategic
elements such as finances, sales, advertising/promotion, competitors,
products, markets, etc., an in-depth evaluation of the selling-
company's personnel should be a major prerequisite in the acquisition
process. They emphasize the personal involvement of the president as
a key criteria for acquisition success. They help identify potential
problem areas in post-acquisition integration.
33
Power suggests that the decision process employed by the
acquiring company can serve as a predictor of future acquisition
success or failure. He postulates that almost all decision processes
involving acquisitions fall into one of the four categories suggested
below:
- the impulse decision process, whereby strategic scan and
search is minimal and decisions are made rapidly.
-16-
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- the rational or analytical decision process, whereby the
strategic scan and search are fairly extensive and detailed.
- the confirmatory decision process involving a pre-sold buyer
whereby the strategic scan or search is directed towards
pre-set objectives to acquire a specific company. Contrary
information or data that suggest "a lack of fit" may be
suppressed.
- the cyclical or iterative decision process involving the
indecisive buyer. This usually occurs when acquisitions are
not driven by a suitable corporate strategy; Information
collection seems to be an end, in and of itself. Prospects
are screened and rejected for various reasons. Ultimate
"buy" decisions are seldom reached.
Power's paper also hints that the method (process) of
investigating and evaluating the acquisition prospect can and does
lead to acquisition failure, if not carried out properly.
Allison34 postulates three paradigms for explaining the
decision-making process in Government. Extending the idea to the
acquisition process in any organization, it may be inferred that the
basic unit of analyses is as follows:
- Organizational action as choice with regard to objectives
or
- Organizational action as output determined largely by
Standard Operating Procedures within the acquiring company
or
- Organizational action as a political resultant (of
bargaining between players internal to the acquiring company
-18-
and ultimately between players internal and external to the
organization).
35
Jemison and Sitkin postulate that there are four major process-
related impediments. According to them, these are as follows:
a) Activity Segmentation
"The technical complexity of the activities surrounding an
acquisition and the traditional roles of the participants
lead to task segmentation. This segmentation produces
conceptually and operationally different analyses and a
disproportionate attention to strategic fit over
organizational fit, thereby decreasing the possibility of
successfully combining the businesses."
b) Escalating Momentum
"The forces which stimulate momentum in the acquisition
process are stronger than those forces which retard its
momentum. The net effect of these forces is an escalating
desire to complete the process quickly which, in turn,
results in premature solutions, less consideration of
integration issues, and lower chances for a successful
outcome."
c) Expectational Ambiguity
"The presence and use of ambiguity during the negotiating
phase of an acquisition is often quite purposeful. But
this same ambiguity, when carried to the integration phase,
can be dysfunctional and reduces the chances for successful
integration."
-19-
d) Management System Missapplicaticn
"The parent's desire to help the new subsidiary and their
confidence about their own capabilities often leads to a
misapplication of management systems which reduces the
chances for the acquisition's ultimate success as a subunit
of the parent firm."
Jemison and Sitkin's study of the Process Perspective of
Acquisitions is the only definitive and comprehensive research on
process-based issues that may lead to the failure of acquisitions.
They use the above framework on impediments, to explain why many
acquisitions are still considered disappointments or failures,
inspite of careful homework of the strategic variables involved.
The implication -is that the managers of acquisitive firms must be
aware of the role played by organizational fit issues and more
importantly, process-related issues.
Howell3 6 gives practical insights into pitfalls in the
acquisition process. The use of line management as an important
constituent in the acquisition decision-making is stressed here.
His accent on decentralized acquisition activity as a key to
successful acquisitions is partly in opposition to Jemison and
Sitkin's conclusions regarding activity segmentation.
Hayes3 7 suggests that sound management appraisal of the
selling company is key to overall success. According to him "the
people crunch is often cited as a prime reason for failure'. He
raises issues of post-acquisition management autonomy, physical
location of pre-merger talks (both formal and informal), management
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style on both sides, acquisition announcements, timing and
negotiation strategy as important process variables. His paper also
suggests key pre-merger human resource issues that the acquiring
company should focus on.
Levinson38 explores the psychological underpinnings of an
acquisition. According to him "unrecognized motives of fear and
obsolesence lead to impulsive actions which magnify the very problems
partnerships should solve." On the premise that psychological
assumptions impact the process and the acquisition outcome, Levinson
suggests ways to circumvent hasty or improper decision-making. He
points out that "the senior executives of the dominant (acquiring)
company should:
- Probe their own motives for merging.
- Review the psychological assumptions that they have about
the other party in the merger.
- Assess the psychological relationships and attitudes of the
people in the junior organization and note how they may
differ from those in their own (the senior) organization.
- Out of open, honest discussion of these motivations,
assumptions, and differences, create a harmonious
atmosphere in which problem-solving mechanisms are set up
so that the anguish of the junior organization can be heard
and acted on, and operating modes can be evolved rather
than operated."
A number of issues raised in Levinson's paper are tied to the
process-related problems of '"Expectational Ambiguity" and "Management
System Misapplications" suggested by Jemison and Sitkin.
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39
Markes in reviewing the current research on mergers and
acquisitions, presents findings related to the following issues:
- the management of the merger process
- the organizational issues in mergers
- the personal issues in mergers.
On the first issue he suggests that "the tendency to consummate
mergers too hastily...is a major contributor to a large number of
failed or disappointing corporate mergers". He further identifies
planning, communication and mutuality as three crucial factors
affecting acquisition response during the process. According to him
"in our own study of corporate mergers ....we are finding that the
process through which a merger or acquisition is managed is more
strongly related to employee response to the combination --either
positive or negative-- than is the degree of change experienced
directly as a result of the event." He suggests that a crucial
reason for a successful merger is "...the emphasis on task or process
orientation."
Ambiguity in dialogue between concerned parties is also
reflected by Leighton & Tod. They suggest that ...(in most
acquisitions) there is an unawareness of the motivations of the
seller." They point to the role of "ambiguity" in the negotiation
process and characterise it as a mistake. They stress the inclusion
of group (operating) management in the process. According to them
"...we cannot overstate the importance of getting to know the
president (of the selling company) and his key personnel." They also
stress the need to allay the anxieties of all concerned stakeholders:
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the seller, the buying company personnel, the suppliers, the
customers and the community. This underscores the need for effective
and timely communication to all concerned and highlights
communication as an important process variable.
CEO whims and influences on the acquisition process is explored
by Hall.4 1 According to Jay Lorsch, Professor at the Harvard
Business School, quoted in Hall's article "The Popular Imagination is
that Managers are very analytic and very systematic.... I think a lot
more decisions are made on serendipity than people think. Things
come across the radar screens and they jump at them." The article
gives several anecdotal examples of acquisition decisions and
suggests that the speed of the acquisition process is also a function
of CEO whim or impulse.
The above are references to the available evidence or the
Acquisition Process. Jemison and Sitkin's work is seminal in this
area because of their consolidated, integrative approach. However,
there is little or no available evidence on how the process actually
takes place in specific organizations (i.e., a descriptive mode) even
though as suggested before, there is plenty of literature on how the
process should take place (i.e., a prescriptive mode, depending on
the specific author's point-of-view).
Chapter 2 describes a framework for the study of the
Acquisition Process. The qualitative research methodology is
explained followed by an introduction to the two subject companies
under study.
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CHAPTER 2
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY
OF THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
1. INTRODUCTION
The first chapter was an overview of the available literature
on the acquisition process. While the list of works on the subject
is by no means exhaustive, the main topical areas have been exposed
to suggest that there may be a distinct lack of a "process" bias in
acquisition decision-making. That is to say, U.S. companies, in
their zeal to make the "strategically" and "organizationally" correct
acquisitions, may not be focussing quite as strongly on "how" they go
about doing the acquisition. The literature suggests that such an
acquisition mode may be a cause for a future lack of complete success
or one of total failure of the acquisition. The process, if
incorrect, may stop a good acquisition from proceeding or may hasten
a bad one to its completion, to the detriment of the acquiring
company. The term "process variables" has been used quite frequently
in this study. Basically they stand for issues such as timing,
communications, physical location of the meeting between interested
parties, negotiating format, etc. (to name a few) that impact the
course of acquisition decision-making. Many such variables were
exposed in the first chapter. Many of these are brought to light in
this and ensuing chapters.
There is some evidence that foreign acquisitors, especially
the Japanesel, are much more keen on fostering a process bias in
their acquisition strategy. That is, process variables such as
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timing, methods such as low-keyed persistence and focus on the
negotiating format etc., (apart from the strategic content) seem to
play a crucial role. The outcomes take longer to happen. However,
the key point of whether Japanese acquisitions of U.S. companies or
vice versa are successful on average in the long run (the indicators
suggest that this might be so because of the deliberate pace
involved) is still open to question.
With this background in mind, the purpose of this chapter is
three-fold:
-- First, to explain a general framework for the study of the
acquisition process.
-- Second, to explain the qualitative research methodology
involved, along with its strengths and shortcomings. The
two sections taken together explain what is being studied
and how, as opposed to why (which formed the basis for
Chapter 1). The problems associated with locating
"suitable" companies are mentioned here.
-- Finally, the two companies being studied are introduced at
the end of the chapter.
2. A GENERAL PROCESS FRAMEWORK
The basic assumption that underlies this study is that the
acquisition process is in itself a significant factor whose
components affect the outcome of any acquisition. Hence, the need
centers around identification of these component variables that
comprise the process perspective, once the company in question moves
into the so-called "acquisition mode". Exhibit 2-1 shows where
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process-based influences impact the company, after it gets into the
acquisition mode.
This exhibit further suggests that once in the acquisition
mode, process issues impact the choice perspective with regard to
strategic and organizational fit variables. At the same time, some
process variables may also directly impact the acquisition decision.
If the decision is GO, that is to acquire, then process variables
impact the outcome in the post-acquisition phase. If the choice is
NOGO, then depending on whether the company prefers to be back in
the acquisition mode or not, process variables come into lay here
as well.
In short, process variables are instrumental in influencing
decision-making at various stages within the acquisition mode. With
this in mind, the key research questions are as follows:
-- What is the Acquisition Process in any organization that is
in an acquisition mode?
-- How are decisions made at various stages both within the
organizational structure and longitudinally over time at
any level? (A related issue is the impact of timing in the
sequence of events that comprise the process).
-- Who are the key players internal and external to the
organization that are involved?
-- What (organizational) levels of decision-making are
involved within the acquiring firm?
-- What are the critical factors affecting management
behavior? What are the individual motivations and
psychological assumptions behind each step of the process?
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-- How is the acquisition activity segmented? Who delegates
and/or coordinates the process?
-- What impacts the speed of the Acquisition Process?
-- How are negotiations (with the seller) handled?
-- What key post-acquisition management issues are at stake?
How are they (potentially) to be handled?
-- When and where does the process begin? What is the impact
of the (physical) meeting location?
-- Is process strategy an understood or preconceived criteria,
prior to the actual process itself? In other words, do
companies have a process plan-of-action in mind in an
a-priori sense?
-- What is being "optimized" at various stages of the process?
-- How does management define "completeness" in its
acquisition strategy?
-- What are the "communication" variables within the acquiring
company? To other stakeholders? To the selling company?
How do these variables change with time as the acquisition
proceeds?
-- How important are intra-company attitudes to the
acquisition? How do they impact the process? What, if
any, is the impact of adverse or favorable employee
reaction within the acquiring firm?
-- What are the management systems in the acquiring company
that are (a) most likely (b) likely (c) least likely to
impact the selling company?
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-- How do personal risk assessments affect the acquisition
decision process?
and finally, a broad general question:
-- What other (company-specific or external) criteria in the
acquisition dynamics affect the Acquisition Process in the
buying company?
Admittedly this is a very large set of research questions each
of which addresses one or several process variables. T is not to
suggest that the study of the two companies will reveal answers to
all these questions or that the answers to these questions constitute
the aim of this study in and of themselves. The basic point here is
that these questions attempt to paint a broad framework within which
the process in any company can be studied in-depth. They are used to
conceptualize areas of focus in studying the Acquisition Process in
Companies A and B.
Companies A and B are introduced toward the end of this
chapter. The next section looks at the research methodology (given
the above framework) used in studying the two companies.
3. THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study is oriented in the form of a research report that
seeks to study the Acquisition Process in two specific companies in
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order to elicit answers to some of the questions posed in the earlier
section. The goal 3 is to:
-- Provide as accurate a description as possible of the process
within each company.
-- To seek from the available data and existing theory specific
threads of evidence that may be a basis for an improved
interpretation of the Acquisition Process in general.
The use of only two specific companies was driven by the need
to explore in depth all of the factors playing a role in the
acquisition - across time and across acquisitions within each
company. An empirical study of the Acquisition Process in a larger,
more "statistically significant" sample of companies was considered
and rejected for the following reasons:
-- The time needed for research;
-- The impression that breadth would have compensated for depth
in the case of each individual company and this was felt to
be of limited utility.
The following criteria4 were considered important:
-- To learn as much as possible about each company from all
available published sources and company contacts;
-- To discover where and how the Acquisition Process began;
-- To be aware of the fact that interviews produced, at
best, partially objective evidence. Hence, the same
interview theme was to be proposed to every individual
questioned (in both companies) in order to rule out to
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rule out to the extent possible, any interviews bias
towards his or her specific role in the
acquisition-decision-making.
The objective was to propose a scheme whereby each company
would provide information on two levels:
1) through semi-structured interviews;
2) through the perusal of documentary evidence-on specific
past acquisitions, press articles, etc.
The actual field work was fraught with difficulty. Companies
A and B, who cooperated in this effort, were forthcoming in varying
degrees. The nature of this research necessitated that these
companies divulge the secret mechanisms driving their respective
acquisition strategies to an outsider. This fact had earlier
prompted several other companies to become very reticent in speaking
about the topic to the author, even after lengthy negotiations and
written assurances.
The method employed in studying the Acquisition Process in
Companies A and B being qualitative in character, essentially three
modes were employed in understanding the process in any one company:
-- unstructured interviews with key acquisition specialists in
the company. Their titles ranged from Vice President for
Advanced Planning, Senior Consultant, Senior Vice President
to Vice President of Finance.
-- Study of specific recent acquisitions done by the company.
Wherever possible, these acquisitions were reconstructed
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longitudinally (over time) in order to get a clearer picture
of the forces at play.
-- Study of available written literature and articles on the
company.
A specific point has to be made concerning the interviews.
Though the framework for the study of the process was broadly hinted
to the participants in the interviews, they were asked to freely
associate with the topic and not be bound to answering specific
questions. The objective was to reveal directly or indirectly, all
possible variables that affected the Acquisition Process in their
respective companies without inflicting any kind of interviewer bias.
They were also asked to voice their opinion on acquisitions in
general, if they so desired. The story of specific acquisitions was
then fleshed out from these interviews and from available evidence
in the acquisition files that the participants chose to make
available to the author. Another reason for not structuring the
interviews very rigidly was to avoid "scaring off" company managers
that the author spoke with.
4. THE SUBJECT COMPANIES INTRODUCED:
a. COMPANY A
Company A was incorporated in the 1920s and until 1969 was
basically in the batteries industry. It branched out into electric
motors, plastics, heat transfer equipment and electronics between
1969-74. Its acquisitions led it further into electronics and
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instrumentation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The focus of the
firm is to become a leading high-technology company.
Currently, the company develops, manufactures, and markets5
electronic systems, components, and instrumentation. It is head-
quartered in the New England area and operates in over fifteen states
with over fifty plants and in eight foreign countries.
The basic diversification moves over the last decade have been
in related areas that use the company's distinctive competencies in
computer hardware/software and electronic materials/devices.
Products range from CAD equipment, test and measuring systems for
health care, anti-submarine warfare communications systems and the
application of VLSI technologies in consumer communications,
industrial and data-processing systems. A number of products are
manufactured abroad in countries such as Korea, the Philippines, and
Canada, among others.
As part of its planning strategy, the company also enters into
joint-ventures with manufacturers in other countries, notably Japan.
The thrust is to exploit the availability of lower manufacturing
costs abroad by joint-venturing with established, efficient
manufacturing operations. Company A revenues are below 3 billion.
Details of the organizational structure and chain of command are
mentioned wherever appropriate in Chapters 3 and 4.
b. COMPANY B
This company was incorporated in the 1960s though the business
had been established much earlier. It is headquartered in the New
York area. The company has had a materials-driven strategy from the
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start. Over the past twenty years, it has acquired businesses in
various metals, plastics, and carbon black. It has asset holdings
(metals, carbon black, etc.) in several countries around the world.
It has subsidiaries in several states in the U.S. and over a dozen
countries around the world.
Its businesses6 are "by choice, capital and technology
intensive." The company also has an oil and gas business including
exploration, production, and pipeline systems. Its metal products
group has a full product line of steels, alloys, and other heat/
corrosion resistant compound metals. The basic markets for this
group are the electronics, electrical, automotive, and aerospace
industries. This group also has a number of registered patents and
trademarks. It also includes a mineral resource and raw materials
supply division to major metals producers. The chemical group in
this company is based around carbon black research, development, and
technical services. All together the company is divided into three
major groups. The basic acquisition strategy is driven from the top
(CEO) and is geared toward the acquisition or development of
materials-related companies that fall under the high-technology area.
The idea here is to exploit in-house materials expertise (along with
expertise obtained through contact with academia) to explore growth
markets. Annual revenues are less than $2 billion. Specific
organizational structure and chain of command issues within Company
B are explored as needed, in Chapters 3 and 4.
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CONCLUS1ON
This chapter lays the basic framework of analysis of the
Acquisition Process. The research methodology, along with its
pitfalls, has been explained in some detail. This was followed by
an introductory sketch of the two companies who agreed to participate
in this study. Specific company information and company identity has
been masked to preserve confidentialty. However, sufficient informa-
tion has been presented to put each company's current businesses in
perspective and to give this thesis the necessary background to be
able to delve into the Acquisition Process within each company. This
is the subject of Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
COMPANY REPORTS
1. INTRODUCTION
This Chapter devotes itself to a detailed explanation of the
Acquisition process at the two major companies introduced in the last
chapter. The general description of the process is supplemented by a
reconstruction of specific acquisitions (wherever applicable).
Company A's data was obtained through several in-depth inter-
views with its VP for Advanced Planning. Functionally, he reported
to one of four group Vice-Presidents at Company A but served all
four functional groups. Exhibit 3-1 details the organizational
structure at Company A. Almost all of the acquisition candidates
were initiated by him for the company at large. Company A can be
described as having a formal Acquisition Process in place. Company
A also provided this author with memos and other literature on two
specific acquisitions. The first Firm Al was a computer
manufacturing company and the latter Firm A2 was a manufacturer of
Industrial Programmable Controllers (PC). Both acquisitions
provided insights into how specific acquisitions were carried out at
Company A, even though the collection of memos available for the
Firm A2 acquisition were minimal. The acquisition of Firm Al is
described in some detail later in this chapter. Finally, process-
related information was also obtained from a number of published
articles on the company, shareholders' reports and other company
literature made available to the author during the course of the
study.
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EXHIBIT 3-1
COMPANY A ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
MANAGEMENT
COMITTEE
CHAIRMAN AND CEO
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Company B's acquisition strategy was smaller in scale compared
to Company A. The decision apparatus was different (Company B
organizational charts were not revealed to the author). Information
was primarily obtained from two sources - The Vice-President in the
Special Materials program within the company and a full-time external
consultant who has been helping the company's Acquisition program.
Other evidence included shareholders' reports and published litera-
ture. Company B was not forthcoming about specific acquisitions.
Data on specific acquisitions was made available only in parts or
through veiled references.
In each of the above two cases, all of the information has been
reproduced as faithfully as possible. As per original agreement,
both companies were given an opportunity to look at the author's
write-up on their respective companies and provide comments. This
was to ensure that the information revealed did not compromise the
companies in any fashion or reveal their identity.
2. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS AT COMPANY A:
a. The Evolution of Corporate Strategy
Before looking at process issues, it is illuminating to look
at how the corporate strategy at Company A has evolved over time.
The strength of one individual has shaped company policy since the
mid-sixties. The firm's direction has reflected his changing vision.
in the sixties the push was for increased R&D and internal growth,
with stringent financial and other controls. This was designed to
---- generate a steady flow of new and improved products which will
continue to contribute a greater portion of the total sales in the
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years to come" . The general idea was to make Company A a dominant
Electrical firm by the late seventies. Several acquisitions were
also made in the electricals field. Batteries were still a driving
force for the company and it was willing to dabble in some unrelated
acquisitions such as real estate. The basic aim however, was
technological leadership through concentrated R&D, large Capital
Expenditures in Plant and Equipment and the expectation that the
Electrical segments would grow faster than the GNP.2
The mid to late seventies saw a change in Company A strategy.
Even though earnings were pushing ahead at over 21% compound annual
rate, the CEO made several mid-c('irse corrections to bet on
Electronics as the major growth sector. There were a number of
reasons given for making this change. Inflationary trends were on
the upswing alongwith sharp declines in the sale of heavy electrical
equipment. Of the four main businesses in Electrical, Battery,
Industrial and Electronics sectors, Electronics had consistently
shown the highest return on investment. It was decided by the CEO,
after internal analysis, that Electronics had the highest potential
for growth in the eighties. The changing strategy caused the company
to aggressively pursue divestiture of businesses (including many of
the 50 or so companies acquired in the last decade) that did not
appear to fit this new vision of the CEO.
During 1977-1979, Acquisition guidelines were revised to
include external acquisitions in the Electronics Areas through
joint-ventures and second-tier venture capital financings.3
Acquiring technology became a sharp motivator. A significant
structural change that followed the changing strategy was the
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creation of a Corporate Development staff under the aegis of a
Vice-President reporting directly to the CEO. The push was on to
grow through the acquisition of other companies possessing
"appropriate" technologies.
The strategy for the eighties was to broaden the high-
4
technology base. In 1980 Company A high-tech businesses accounted
for 32 % of the total sales and 47 % of the earnings compared to 28%
and 38% respectively, the previous year.5 The company had made a
few very large acquisitions in the seventies in High-Tech areas and
had also tried a few abortive hostile takeovers. It was felt that
in the eighties the company should concentrate on acquiring small
firms with cutting-edge technology and "people". Batteries,
Industrial products, etc. were on the way out; Factory Automation,
Computer Systems and Software, Defense and Medical Electronics were
on the way in.
The make-up of top management and personnel being promoted to
the executive level also reflected this changing strategy. Personnel
from acquired firms were increasingly assuming key jobs within
Company A. The Company changed its structure in 1983 in order to
reflect a market-orientation as a means to facilitate its acquisition
strategy and new direction. The change from a mature-industry
participant to a high-tech company was also evident in the changed
dividend policy that reflected lower payout ratios.
The current thinking is to consolidate the number of
acquisitions made in response to the changing strategy into two focal
areas - Factory Automation and Defense. Also, acquisitions in the
future are expected to continue in growth areas.6
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b. The General Process Description
The acquisition strategy at Company A is very much driven by
the CEO's aggressive style. However, the main Groups shown in the
company's organizational structure (Exhibit 3-1) are very autonomous
in terms of operating style and available latitude of decision-
making. All the groups do not lead the search for potential
acquisitions. The majority of the identified candidates were
presented by the Vice-President for Advanced Planning (VP-A) in
Group I. He reports to the group Vice-President, who in turn reports
to the President for operating decisions, but most often directly to
the CEO on strategic decisions, such as acquisitions. Each group is
autonomous with its own board of internal and external directors.
The VP-A routes his recommendations to the group concerned which then
may become involved in the nitty-gritty details. The VP-A gets
involved in practically every step of the pre-Acquisition Process.
The VP-A was responsible in the seventies for writing a defini-
tive essay on "Venturing as a diversification/acquisition technique"
for the benefit of Company A Senior Management. This enabled
Company A to participate in a modest venture-capital role for the
company (only second-tier financings were involved, without Company
A actually participating in managing the companies they invested in
or sitting on any of the Boards). More importantly the VP-A's work
identified key issues needed to be addressed for participation in
high-tech businesses. The suggested elements were:
- Corporate Climate
- Organization
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- Investment Strategy
- Capital Appreciation
- Venture Capital Management
- Business assessments
Company A wanted to look into Industries and Markets such as:
- Industrial Electronics
- Test and Measurement
- Medical Technology
- Automatic Test Equipment
- Data Communications
- Energy Management
- Power Conversion
- Material Processing
- Computer Technology
Most of the criteria utilized in analyzing companies in the Venture
Capital role were financial in character with certain "soft"
organizational issues such as management strength included as well.
The general idea was that a second-tier investment strategy in a
growth company "may lead to a possible acquisition at a later
date".7 However, Company A did not go very far in the venture
capital route because of a very conservative and cautious investment
philosophy.
The lessons learned in the venture route, led to a more aggres-
sive stance in actual acquisitions. The strategy over time was to
build a solid, integrated capability in the areas of Electronics for
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Computer Systems and Factory Automation purposes. Firm Al and A2
were large acquisitions that formed part of the overall factory
automation strategy shown in Exhibit 3-2.
One of the primary moves was the development of a broad and
comprehensive internal memo called "growth areas of interest". This
outlined for instance, viable areas within computer products for
Company A to get into such as Artificial Intelligence, peripherals,
communication networks, etc. Exhibit 3-3 shows a summary outine of
the kinds of information that Company A had to develop for any
acquisition candidate.
The initial outline for candidate presentation is supplemented
by a rigorous preacquisition checklist. Exhibit 3-4 shows the
management-related issues in the check-list. In addition, each of
the following "strategic" issues are covered throughly (the source
is the same internal memo) including:
- Financial (42 different criteria)
- Marketing (15 different sales and distribution criteria, 5
for advertising and Promotion)
Competitors (9 different criteria)
- International Aspects (4 different criteria)
- The Product (15 different criteria)
- Engineering, R&D (16 different criteria)
- Manufacturing (22 different criteria)
- Labor (22 different criteria)
- Key Management Attitudes (11 different criteria, included in
Exhibit 3-5)
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EXHIBIT 3-3
OUTLINE FOR CANDIDATE PRESENTATION
- HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
- BASIC OPERATIONS DESCRIBED
MARKETING
MANUFACTURING
R&D, ENGINEERING
MANAGEMENT AND DIRECTORS
OUTSIDE PROFESSIONALS
OTHER BASIC INFORMTION
- BASIC FINANCIAL DATA
OPERATING STATEMENTS
OPERATING STATEMENT ANALYSIS
FUTURE PROJECTIONS, WHAT, WHEN
OWNERSHIP STATEMENT
- BASIC PROPOSAL AND ITS EFFECT IN COMBINATION WITH COMPANY A
Source: Discussions with the VP-Advanced Planning of Company A
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EXHIBIT 3-4
MANAGEMENT- RELATED ISSUES IN PRE-ACQUISITION CHECKLIST
- APPOINTMENT OF COMPANY A ACQUISITION TEAM AND TEAM-LEADER
- MAINTAIN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH KEY MANAGEMENT AND BOARD RIGHT UP
TO CLOSING DATE
- HISTORY OF BUSINESS
- DESCRIPTION OF THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE
- LIST OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS; BIOGRAPHIES OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS,
SALARIES.
- STOCK DEMOGRAPHY AND DISTRIBUTION : WHO, WHERE, HOW MUCH,
ATTITUDES, ETC.
- ORGANIZATION CHART
- POLICY MANUAL,IF ANY
- PERSONNEL MANUAL
- PROSPECT'S DIVIDENDS AND OTHER FINANCIAL POLICIES
- EXTENT OF INTEGRATION OF COMPANY - POTENTIAL FOR VERTICAL
EXPANSION OR INTEGRATION
- PHILOSOPHY OF MANAGEMENT ON MATTERS SUCH AS GROWTH, INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, ORGANIZATIONAL PLANNING, INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING,
MERCHANDISING, EDUCATIONAL SELLING, ADVERTISING, ACCOUNTING AND
BUDGETING, R&D, ENGINEERING, PRODUCT DESIGN ETC.
- CAN WE EVALUATE THE COMPANY OURSELVES OR MUST WE HIRE OUTSIDE
CONSULTANTS FOR PERSONNEL ANALYSIS, MARKET RESEARCH OR OTHER
FACTORS? WHO?
- ARE THERE ANY LEGAL PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO THE COMPANY, ITS
PRODUCTS, OR THE INDUSTRY?
- WHAT CONSULTING FIRMS HAVE BEEN OR ARE BEING RETAINED BY THE FIRM?
- HOW ARE RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNITY?
- WHAT IS THE POLICY CONCERNING PATENT PROTECTION?
- ARE COMPANY'S NAME AND TRADEMARK WELL- KNOWN? ARE THEY
CONFUSINGLY SIMILAR TO ANY OTHER FIRM'S NAME AND TRADEMARK?
- STOCKHOLDER RELAIIONS
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- AUDITOR RELATIONS
- DOES THE PROSPECT'S MANAGEMENT SHARE WITH THE ACQUIRER'S
MANAGEMENT A SIMILAR CONCEPT OF BUSINESS AND MORALITY?
- IS THE PROSPECT'S MANAGEMENT CAPABLE?
- WILL MANAGEMENT CONTINUITY BE AFFECTED BY THE ACQUISITION?
- HAS THE PROSPECT'S MANAGEMENT PERMITTED ITS COMPANY TO ACHIEVE
MAXIMUM PROFITS?
- DO THE PROSPECT'S EXECUTIVES UNDERSTAND WHAT THEIR
RESPONSIBILITIES ARE?
- ARE THEY CAPABLE OF DELEGATING AUTHORITY? HAVE THEY CONDONED
OVERLAPPING LINES OF AUTHORITY?
- HAS THE PROSPECT'S MANAGEMENT USED CAPITAL EFFECTIVELY TO PRODUCE
EARNINGS?
- HAS THE PROSPECT BEEN OPERATED FOR THE BENEFIT OF STOCKHOLDERS OR
MANAGEMENT?
- ARE THE DIRECTORS KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE PROSPECT'S BUSINESS?
DO THE DIRECTORS GET ENOUGH INFORMATION ABOUT THE COMPANY'S
ACTIVITIES?
- DO THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS HAVE SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM BUDGETS?
- DO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PREPARED FOR INTERNAL USE SUPPLY
MEANINGFUL DATA?
Source: Company A Internal Memo
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According to the VP-A, the advantage of having this compre-
hensive list lies in knowing before-hand all the bases that need to
be covered. This is expected to leave very little to chance.
Which companies to acquire is basically arrived at through an
"internal" selection process. The VP-A does a majority of the candi-
date identification and assessment duties himself, with the help of
other divisional staff. Over 50 % of the leads are obtained through
venture capital sources (journals, contacts etc.). Sometimes,
Investment Banking Firms approach the VP - A or the V.P. of Corporate
Development with a business plan in hand.
Company A wants to acquire companies with proven results and a
growth-track that shows their capability of being run effectively in
a stand-alone mode. Typically, Company A does not want to put
management into the companies it acquires. Knowing that (in the
high-tech area) it is buying both a product and people, Company A
considers the "love-making" crucial. The people interface is kept
as smooth as possible, the basic assumption being that the "selling
company" personnel perceive the acquirer as difficult to work for
unless the acquirer's good intentions are well-kno-wn and publicized.
The need for the selling company's employees to be retained
with the right attitude marks a radical departure from the CEO's
style in the late sixties and seventies. His acquisition style was
aggressive and heavy-handed. The prevailing notion then was that
"corporate control specialists" were always needed to "rein-in" the
newly acquired companies. A large management turnover in the late
seventies coming in the face of the strategic redirection for the
company convinced the CEO that running interference in day-to-day
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operations of the divisions and misapplying corporate policies on
newly-acquired firms was inimical to long-term company interests.
The changing strategy helped change the CEO's perspectives and style
on how to acquire and run growth companies, the upshot being an
"arms-length" philosophy for any acquisition, to be followed by
phased integration into overall Company A activity.
According to the VP-A, Company A does not consider "speeding up
the process" crucial to the acquisitions that are initiated.
"Timing" of the various moves is however, considered important (the
lack of a timing perspective cost the company a few strategic
candidates in the seventies).
Once the prospective candidates are identified, the VP-A "shops
around" for the ideal match. The VP-A has the experience of having
acquired over 40 companies, with a dozen or so as a member of
Company A. According to him, once Company A makes up its mind about
a particular candidate, the process escalates rapidly to the point
where the deal is "consummated" as efficiently as possible (through
a "sensitive" approach to the marriage partner, that ensures that
the selling company does not feel "emasculated").
After the candidate has been identified, the VP-A acts as an
initiator of dialogue and data-gatherer. At any one time, the VP-A
keeps track of about 200 potential candidates.
The ultimate decision-making authority rests with the parti-
cular group's Board of Directors in consonance with the CEO of the
corporation. The important idea is to do the "homework"
professionally before the decision-making process. This starts out
with identifying the company through D&B and other financial reports.
-53-
It is considered very important to see who is investing in the
company (the venture capital community is considered the easiest to
deal with, because of the VP-A's contacts). Otherwise, the bankers
or accountants are scanned to see who can make the "proper
introductions". Sometimes, a direct call is made to the CEO of the
selling firm to see if he is interested in "meeting and talking".
The preacquisition checklist and the guidelines for candidate
presentation are used (to the extent possible) to get a "feel" for
the other company. Company A generally uses "financial
considerations" to screen out unfit candidates. After the initial
screen, it is imperative from Company A's point-of-view not to let
the other company know that "you are in a hurry to get married".
The first meeting usually involves the VP-A and perhaps one or
more division staff members from Company A and the selling company's
President at the selling company's headquarters. There are two main
reasons for the preliminary contact:
- to gauge the President's interest in selling to Company A
- to introduce Company A to the President via a presentation,
etc.
Typically, the President responds back tentatively. At the
same time , the VP-A arranges another on-site follow-up visit (by
the time the third meeting takes place says the VP-A "-- I know if
the deal will come through --"). Two or three trips are considered
sufficient to provide enough information needed in the check-list.
Actual negotiations are not considered a problem once the "homework"
has been done well. The implication here is that "strategic"
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variables if defined and understood properly, enable Company A to
give and take the right amounts during the negotiation phase,
resulting in a "successful" buy. Au contraire, if the homework is
not done properly, the negotiations usually fail.
For Company A, it is crucial that someone be the team-leader.
Typically, 3-5 individuals are brought in for analysis and on-site
visits from operations, marketing, finance, technical staff, etc.
(the Firm Al acquisition involved a HR specialist). These
individuals come from either company headquarters or any of the
Groups to assist in the effort.
The attitudes of Company A personnel (for or against the
acquisition) on average is not considered critical to the Acquisition
Process. Their opinions are not considered critical because by and
large, pre-acquisition plans are kept secret. However, the backing
of senior divisional management is considered crucial. According to
the VP-A, he has very good relations with the division managers
because if they are not receptive then the deal is "---as good as
dead". Over the last five years or so, the CEO has made a concerted
effort to let the selection authority reside autonomously within the
Groups.
Timely and periodic communication to both external and internal
sources is considered very important. Internally, this means
periodic memos from the VP-A to other senior management and concerned
personnel. Review meetings are also held periodically in order to
get everyones input and commitment to the project and also to
acquaint senior management of the acquisition's progress.
Externally, the communication between Company A and the interested
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party is usually verbal. There is some letter follow-up, if initial
indicators appear to be promising, in order to continue the love-
making. According to the VP-A's philosophy, "-- The less written
the better --". The fundamental strength, according to him, that is
tantamount to a critical success factor is "the personal
understanding of the other guy's business". In other words, Company
A tries to go into the preacquisition phase with a fairly broad
knowledge of the business that they want to get into. According to
the VP-A "---our depth of understanding surprises those guys, since
we talk his language---". This is expected to facilitate
communication and put it on a very professional level.
The depth of management is gauged through the contacts that the
VP-A and his team have with the other team's management. Hearsay or
other documented evidence (obtained via consultants, investment
bankers, etc.) are given minor importance compared to face-to-face
dialogue with the selling company's President and other team members
at the second or third level. An exhaustive management report is
normally put together for the benefit of Company A senior management,
by the VP-A.
The chain of command for reporting purposes, is shown in
Exhibit 3-5. This shows the VP-A as the main initiator of
acquisitions.
The lines indicate that VP-A reports to the Group VP of Group
1 on a day-to-day basis. Depending on a specific Group's potential
acquisition that he may be working on, he also reports to the VP of
that Group. Group 4 (Defense-related activity) is usually not a
part of this chain. Support personnel from other Groups are matrixed
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in, as and when necessary, to help the VP-A. The role of Corporate
Development is fairly unique. It takes over once the negotiation
phase is ready and is aided by the Corporate Staff members such as
Legal/Financial/Audit/Human Resources, etc., and helps to physicially
consummate the deal. At that stage, the VP-A's role is no longer
proactive but more that of an adviser to the proceedings (because of
the rapport & trust that he has created with the selling party).
The CEO is involved in the negotiation phase when the selling company
President makes his first visit to Company A headquarters. The CEO
is actively involved in understanding each acquisition through his
attendance of Group Board meetings, Corporate Development Review
meetings (attended by the VP-A) and meetings of the Management
Committee. The President/COO is usually involved also, though his
responsibilities are brought into focus more during the post-
acquisition integration and operational phases.
One way for the VP-A to know what each Group wants (each Group
has several divisions) is to attend every division's strategy review
meeting that takes place once-a-year. This gives him an inkling as
to what to aim for during the following year in the short-term/
long-term (the strategy review meetings usually look at 3-5 years
down the road). This enables the VP-A to:
- Go after specific acqusition candidates in known areas for
each Group.
- Seek future compatibilities for the corporation as a whole.
The divisions consider the VP-A's role as a that of an "external
consulting and implementation resource".
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After the due-diligence criteria in the acquisition check list
have been understood by both managements, a "letter of intent" is
signed and a definitive purchase/sale agreement goes to the Corporate
Boards of both parties. This is a definitive offer. Three months to
one year would have normally . psed between the time an acquisition
candidate is selected and an offer is made to the Board of Directors
of this candidate.
A point is noteworthy here on the use of "outside consultants".
The VP-A suggested that technical, marketing and audit expertise are
the only two areas that external consultants may be brought into
during the preacquisition phase. As he put it "Things we can't do,
we use external consultants". There is also an in-built distrust
against investment bankers because of the feeling that they tend to
"hurry-up" the deal (Investment bankers are usually paid a fixed fee
regardless of the length of time involved in the acquisition) and
that they are good only at structuring deals but not understanding
the business involved. Company A being "technology hungry" is less-
driven by financial considerations as the end-all, even though
financial cut-offs may be used actively as a preliminary screen.
The approval of the offer by both Boards, following negotia-
tions formally and informally, is key to the actual integration
process yet to come. By this time the deal has been structured and
the GO/NOGO decision has been reached.
A GO decision by both parties involved, puts the coupling
mechanism to work. Post-acquisition integration questions are dealt
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with according to pre-conceived methodologies. These include:
- Financial integration of the company books. This takes place
first within 30 days. Financial staff are integrated at-the
Corporate level.
- A "hands-off" attitude is used in running the business, in
the short-term which may extend a few years into the future.
Management incentive, control, reporting mechanism changes
are minimal. The President of the "subsidiary" is given
tremendous latitude and reports directly to the Group
Vice-President (his company now belongs to that Group).
Care is taken to minimize management turnover, unless called
for by "strategic reasons" to reduce management.
- Since the CEO of Company A ultimately "does the deal" his
continuing involvement and rapport with the acquired
Company's President in the near term is "kept up" to
maintain continuity and goodwill.
- Other operational integration is basically left to the
operating Group and it usually runs its own course. This is
turning out to be a problem for Company A of late, since it
has to mesh many "loosely driven" companies, without formal
"integration" mechanisms to harmoniously coalesce all these
entities together.
c. The Acquisition of Firm Al
i. Introduction to Firm Al
Firm Al is a manufacturing company specializing in the
manufacture of 32-bit computer systems primarily to the OEM market.
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The applications for the market include simulation, energy management
and scientific computation. Their computers are "experts" in storing
and processing real-time data. Firm Al's markets are international
in character with principal locations in the United States, Canada,
Israel, Australia, and Western Europe. Revenues for Firm Al were
around $80 million at the time of the acquisition.
ii. A Longitudinal Construct of the Acquisition
The potential availability of Firm Al as a candidate for
acquisition became known to Company A through researching the
technical and financial reports and other publicly available data on
minicomputer companies. Company A was ready to acquire a mini-
computer company in order to propel its factory automation strategy
forward. There was sufficient publicly available information on
Firm Al to spark Company A's interest. The VP-A called up Firm Al's
President, introduced himself and requested a meeting at the
President's location. The President's acceptance indicated to the
VP-A that he was interested in "talking". The preliminary contact
was made by the VP-A on April 7, 19XX. The venue was Firm Al's
headquarters. Representing Company A were the VP-A and the VP of
Group i. Firm Al was represented by the President of the company
and his Vice-President of Finance. The reason given for the meeting
was "to explore fit in the factory automation field between Firm Al
and Company A."
This contact enabled the VP-A to understand the history of Firm
Al and to get marketing information (including customers, suppliers,
future growth opportunities, previous tie-ins with Company A since
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Firm Al had supplied computers to one of their divisions in the past,
business tie-ins with other companies, domestic and foreign sales,
competition, etc.), financial information (sales, NI, estimated
backlog, estimated future orders, financial structure, etc.), and
business strengths and weaknesses (in R&D, organization,
manufacturing, management, compensation structure). These were.
summarized for the benefit of the COO of Company A and the VP of
Corporate Development in an April 9, 19XX memo. This memo included
a short sketch of the VP-A's personal "gut-feel" of the situation.
This included information on:
- what Firm Al's owner actually said he wanted and what he
"seemed to be" wanting.
- what Firm Al's criteria were for selling.
- information on compatability (market, technology, etc.) with
Company A's divisions.
- the need for a tax-free stock deal (apparently an
"intentional" slip on the part of Firm Al's President) with
an additional "premium" over market price.
- whcher or not Firm Al would open up secondary markets.
The initial contact and follow-up information to Company A
senior management was accomplished in less than a week.
The day after the trip to Firm Al's premises (on April 8,
19XX), the VP-A wrote back to the President of Firm Al thanking him
for his hospitality and the information on the application of Firm
Al computers to the overall factory automation field. An invitation
was extended to the President of Firm Al to visit Company A's
application marketing groups (within specific divisions). The letter
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also indicated that the CEO of Company A had a winter house in the
vicinity of Firm Al, and would be pleased to meet with the President
and his associates of Firm Al at a mutually convenient time. A copy
of Company A's Corporate Fact Book and a list of questions that
Company A wished to explore in-depth with Firm Al were mailed along-
with this letter. The letter also indicated as a post-script that
both he (the VP-A) and his boss would be on the road until April 28,
19XX and that they could be contacted at any time after that. This
was purportedly to give the President of Firm Al at least three weeks
to mull over Company A's initial overtures before contemplating a
reply.
The structure of Firm Al (Exhibit 3-6) was quite simple enough
for decisions to be taken fairly quickly. The main players involved
from their point-of view was the President and his VP of Finance.
The President was also a large shareholder in the company.
Subsequent to April 8, the President of Firm Al suggested (by
telephone) to the VP-A that he wanted to visit the PC division in
order to explore in further detail, Company A's long-term objective
to enter the full-field of Factory Automation and Data Communication.
A trip was arranged for June 19, l9XX. The Group VP of Group 1,
alongwith senior-executives from the PC division and the VP-A
coordinated the visit. During this visit, the President of Firm Al
also brought with him more detailed information about current
financials, five-year projections, markets and new products. The
President also outlined his needs in terms of Price Range, Incentives
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EXHIBIT 3-6
STRUCTURE OF FIRM Al
PRESIDENT
Source: Internal File on Firm Al at Company A.
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for his managers, etc. He also volunteered that in the event of a
sale he would be stepping down and recommended the VP of Finance or
the VP of Products and Services as potential replacements for his
position. This visit coupled with the additional information made
available, allowed t.e VP-A to consolidate his "homework" done over
the past two months. The time was considered appropriate to make
concrete recommendations to the COO and VP of Corporate Development.
On June 20, 19XX, the VP-A wrote a memo to these two senior
managers outlining:
- The P/E used in valuing Firm Al.
- The market value of Firm Al based on stock price.
- The number of Company A shares to be paid alongwith the
effects of dilution.
- The Actual Income Statement for Firm Al, with projections
for the next five years.
- The actual 19XX Balance Sheet for Firm Al alongwith
projections for the next five years.
- The Orders/Backlog/Revenue and Profit Statistics by quarter
since Firm Al's inception (including the tax effect),
alongwith future trends.
Most of the strategic analysis was done by the VP-A with the
help of assistants drawn from the PC division and the finance staff
at corporate headquarters. After the June 19 meeting, the President
of Firm Al was supposed to get back to Company A within 30 days,
after discussing the price and the implications of being taken over
with his board of directors. He did not get back to the VP-A until
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July 25 (a telephone call). He hinted that Firm Al stock had
appreciated in the interim and that this called for a revaluation of
the financials. He also however, showed his continuing interest by
asking to meet with the CEO of Company A at his winter house. He
suggested that the preliminary feedback from an informal "chat" with
his board nembers was positive but that the matter had to be brought
up during Firm Al's next board meeting on September 5, l9XX. The
VP-A promised to get back to him. The gist of this telephone call
was recorded in a memo to the COO from the VP-A. This memo also
analyzed the list of Directors at Firm Al. A "gut-feel" analysis of
the Board suggested that one of the Investment Banker/Director's at
Firm Al may oppose the acquisition more. This memo did not
concentrate on strategic issues but dwelt largely on appraising each
individual Firm Al manager at the level directly below the President.
Personality traits were described in detail. The VP-A recommended
that the CEO of Company A should meet with the President of Firm Al,
as the "signs" looked good both from a strategic and organizational
perspective.
The VP-A arranged for a follow-up meeting with Firm Al
executives on August 22, 19XX to agree on the financial revaluation
and to have a joint dialogue prior to the Firm A September Board
meeting. This meeting was a top-level meeting on both sides
suggesting the rapid convergence of ideas and interests. It also
showed the preliminary stage at which the CEO of Company A normally
got involved in the pre-acquisition phase. The venue was the CEO's
winter house located near Firm Al's corporate offices. The
participants included the President and VP-Finance from Firm Al.
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The CEO, COO, roup VP of group 1 and the VP-A represented Company
A. As always, the VP-A acted as the chairperson and coordinator of
the meeting. As always, financials were discussed at the top of the
agenda. The price changes were discussed alongwith other financial
considerations such as forecast of sales, NI, EPS, etc. These
numbers were the ones to be presented to Firm Al's Board (however,
managements' internal goals that were higher were also presented).
The ultimate price, according to the President of Firm Al, was up to
his Board of Directors. This was considered as a "hedge" (against
making any concrete decisions) on the part of Firm Al's President.
In an evaluative memo to the COO on August 26, 19XX the VP-A
suggested that attractive employment contracts would have to be
devised (as a sweetner) to Firm Al's upper management. He suggested
that the VP of Finance as President would help keep Firm Al strong
and independent (the suggestion being that Firm Al needed to be
independent to be a viable part of Company A in the future). He
also suggested the need to convince Firm Al directors that Company A
stock would appreciate in the future. This memo also revealed that
the second Investment Banker (advising Firm Al) was pushing for Firm
Al to get acquired as soon as possible by Company A. Hence, the
VP-A underscored the need to accelerate the acquisition momentum in
order to preempt other parties that might potentially get interested
in Firm Al.
The VP-A then arranged for the CEO and COO to meet with Firm
Al management in situ on September 3 and 4, l9XX. This meeting was
to be followed by the presentation by Firm Al management to their
Board on September 5, 19XX, in order to present Company A's interest.
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The Board would then mull over the offer, debate it and finally,
come up with a reply to Company A.
The VP-A's active involvement did not end at this stage.
Looking ahead, with the assumption that the Board would give the
green signal, in-depth studies of Firm Al had to be done with a view
towards understanding how best to merge its resources with that of
Company A (and also to assess how much Firm Al was actually worth).
A green signal implied that Firm Al would be more forthcoming in
terms of information for assessment purposes. On August 28, 19XX
the VP-A wrote to the COO outlining a table that showed how the
indepth study of Firm Al would be carried out. Exhibit 3-7 shows a
listing of the staff involved.
The venue for each team and contacts at Firm Al were also laid
out in detail. The preliminary "green signal" was obtained from
Firm Al and on September 9, 19XX, the VP-A sent a memo to his boss
suggesting that additional group members be sent to Firm Al to add
to the body of knowledge. The acccent here was to send in "operating
managers" as opposed to staff because of the need to identify
operating strengths and weaknesses that may aid in the post-
acquisition phase. The operating managers and their staff had not
been involved in any active sense (except for the Group Vice-
Presidents and the PC division managers). The potential acquisition
of Firm Al was starting to become an operational reality.
The group members for this stage of pre-acquisition analysis
and the individuals in Exhibit 3-7 would be submitting "independent"
reports that would cover assembled facts with conclusions and
recommendations. They will submit these reports in confidence to
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EXHIBIT 3-7
PLAYERS INVOLVED IN THE IN-DEPTH
PRE-ACQUISITION STUDY OF FIRM Al
STUDY VISIT DATE,
SEPTEMBER, 19INDIVIDUALS
a) ACCOUNTS
- 1 MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT
- 2 AUDIT PARTNERS
b) BUSINESS ASSESSMENT
c) PC DIVISION
- 1 FUNCTIONAL AUTOMATION EXPERT
- 1 ENGINEERING EXPERT
- 1 MARKETING EXPERT
- 1 MARKETING ANALYST
- 1 VP-FINANCE
- 1 OPERATIONS ANALYST
- 1 FINANCE ANALYST
- 1 ADVANCE PLANNING ANALYST
- 1 MATERIALS CONTROL EXPERT
10, 11
10, 11
16, 17, 18
16, 17, 18
15, 16, 17, 18
15, 16, 17, 18
15, 16, 17, 18
10, 11
10, 11
D) GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTS DIVISION
- ADVANCED PROGRAM MANAGER
- ADVANCED SYSTEMS TECHNICAL MANAGER
E) R&D
- PROJECT MANAGER
F) CORPORATE
- VP-CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT
- CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR
- EMPLOYEE BENEFITS-DIRECTOR
- TAX DEPARTMENTS
- CORPORATE COITROLLER
G) COMPANY A INVESTMENT BANKERS
- 2 DIRECTORS
Source: Internal Company A File on Firm Al's Acquisition.
- VP-A
9, 10
11
10
10
10
9, 10
9, 10
9, 10
9, 10
10
15
-69-
four individuals - the COO, the Group VP of Group 1, the VP of
Corporate Development and VP-A.
At this stage, the VP of Corporate Development had become the
more proactive element at Company A. The aim was to structure "the
right deal" for presentation to the Company A Board of Directors,
based on all of the available information and attendant analysis.
A special confidential report of the major items in the
Acquisition Process was prepared for the benefit of Company A Board
of Directors. The legal issues were thrashed out and finally a
special meeting of shareholders was announced on November 25,
19XX. A joint proxy statement was furnished both to stockholders
of Company A and Firm Al in order to solicit proxies to be used at
their respective shareholder's meetings. Both meetings (at their
own respective venues) were to take place on December 17, 19XX.
The terms of the merger were agreed to unequivocally by both
Boards and Firm Al became part of Company A in early January
thereafter. The overall duration was less than nine months, which
was faster than the normal pace for an acquisition of this size
(much smaller acquisitions were done by Company A in 3-6 months and
the trend seems to be headed in this direction) for Company A.
The speed of the acquisition may have created problems that
could have been ruled out otherwise. There were two problems that
were primary to the acquisition of Firm Al. One was strategic in
nature.1 The compatibility of Firm Al's Computer Operating
Systems Application Software and the level of standardization with
Company A Factory Automation Systems were hugely overstated prior to
the acquisition. One reason may have been the lack of involvement
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of operating managers earlier in the acquisition itself. Their
involvement late in the game seemed to reflect a situation where
they may have been merely endorsing decisions already taken by more
senior management. This author was not able to see the content of
the pre-acquisition analyses done in September, 19XX by the various
operating managers.
The other problem was Firm Al management turnover during the
year following the acquisition. This may have been caused partly by
the fact that the speed of the acquisition left many Firm Al managers
suddenly confronted with the reality of being part of a billion
dollar company after having been a part of an 80 million company.
Also, the prospect of facing heavy-handed corporate interference in
day-to-day business affairs (though indications suggest that by this
time the company was enthusiastic about the prospect of having
"Autonomous subsidiaries" in the short run) may have induced several
top managers to quit the company.
Both of these reasons reduced the utility of Firm Al to
Company A, though it was successfully integrated into Group 1 of
-Company A within a couple of years after the acquisition. Exhibit
3-8 is a tabular summary of the main steps involved in the
acquisition of Firm Al.
3. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS AT COMPANY B
a. The Evolving Corporate Strategy
For over 50 years Company B was basically a "Carbon Black"
manufacturer with very limited growth prospects and in a cyclical
industry with an overreliance on the automobile and tire industries
-71-
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as buyers, Its main strength was that it was one of the lowest cost
producers in the industry.12 Since 1969 the company has diversi-
fied through acquisitions into speciality metals and energy (mainly
gas) businesses which in 1980 accounted for over 60% of total
revenues. Carbon Black and Chemicals accounted for about a third of
total revenues and 25% of the overall profits. However, it was
recognized around the beginning of 1983 that there were no "cutting
edge" growth technologies within the Company, even in the speciality
metals group. The CEO was determined to change the stance of the
company away from mature industries. A "special materials program",
almost like a fourth group, was started separate from mainstream
operations. Headed by a Vice-President for Acquisitions it initially
had a was fairly fluid charter. He gathered a research team under a
Ph.D in Materials Science and asked them to look into "growing
industrial markets". The final technologies and materials program
to be pursued had to:
- be part of a growing demand.
- springboard of in-house expertise in materials science.
- exploit synergies with in-house product/process knowlege that
was part of on-going operations and fields of interest.
The support and emotional style of the CEO was fully behind
this venture. The "traditions" of the company excluded it from going
after biotechnology or computer-related companies.1 3
According to the Senior-VP of Company B, also a member of this
new group, "....you want to know what you are doing. If you don't
know how to manage the (acquired) company then don't buy it. If good
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management comes with it, then good. The point is that senior
management at Company B should be able to pick a good Division
President. Sometimes (the acquired Company's Senior Management)
aren't excluded when they should have been excluded."
The strategy at Company B has been heavily "top-driven".
External consultants from a reputed East Cost firml4 helped
identify the external growth areas in Technical Ceramics, after
internal groups within Company B had exhaustively explored R&D and
other internal developmental methodologies and rejected them as
viable growth prospects.
Under Technical Ceramics there was the option of going either
into Structural Ceramics or Electronic materials. The former had
fairly poor markets, heavy competition from entrenched players and
long lead times before any operation could prove profitable. Hence,
Company B fell back into diversifying through acquisitions in the
area of Electronic Ceramics.
In sum, Electronic Ceramics would form the basis of Company
B's future growth through acquisitions.
b. The General Process
One of the disadvantages of the study of the Acquisition
Process at Company B was that the individuals concerned would speak
only in generalities and were unwilling to speak about any
acquisition in depth. The area of Electronic Ceramics was an
entirely new area with few established players but many, relatively
unknown, companies were beginning to emerge. The Acquisition Process
at Company B from beginning to the end can be classified as "random"
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as opposed to a structured, formally developed methodology as in the
case of Company A. This not to say that Company B did not or does
not know what it is doing. It means that "....there are no standards
..15to the game.
The process is initiated at the top (CEO level), with the work
being privy to a handful of participants at a very senior level at
Company B.
The search is started with the list of companies in the
American Society of Ceramics, coupled with D&B reports1 6 in order
to generate companies of interest. No specific cut-off screens are
preestablished and each company is appraised on a one-on-one basis.
Strategic issues for screeing include - technological fit, management
potential (minor), age of the company, etc.
A smaller list is generated as a number of events precipitate
a further narrowing down of the choices:
- External consultants are brought in to identify specific
companies.
- Staff work is carried on simultaneously to assess and either
accept or reject companies in the list.
Inputs of the CEO himself, alongwith those from members of the
R&D staff and others in the acquisition staff are pooled together.
Though the CEO has a great influence on ultimate candidate
selection, the process of narrowing the number down to 2 or 3
candidates is very much left to the members of the Special Materials
Program. The stage at which marketing, finance and other disciplines
are brought in for their specific expertise is usually when the list
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is down to five or ten companies. In-depth analysis is being done
earlier and earlier in the process as the Special Materials Program
expands in scope. This is because the initial universe of probable
companies has been identified and the incremental list of companies
is much smaller. The reliability of available information is
thoroughly questioned and the recommendations are researched fully
before being presented to the CEO.
The initial contact varies from cold calls for a meeting to
recommendations from mutually acceptable sources. The key from the
Senior V.P.'s point-of-view is that "...you home in on who is going
to do the negotiations for you and their guy...".
One of the problems encountered by Company B is the paucity of
information available from smaller companies that they traditionally
go after. Most times the initial contact helps Company B obtain the
selling company's Market and Business Plan, for a more exhaustive
(in-house) analysis of the selling company.
Company B uses financials as the base for its negotiation
strategy but believes that if an acquisition candidate has passed the
various hurdles to the point where the parties are "talking", then
it is not so much the price but the "package" offered that becomes
important. For instance, apart from paying fair market value for the
physical assets being considered, many entrepreneurs selling their
companies want a medium-term "consulting" contract. This is usually
written into the package. The key according to the Senior V.P. is
"....to find out what he (the seller) really wants".
Company B's acquisition strategy is still in the learning
process and consequently there is the in-built realization in all
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the acquisition team-members that their strategy must be fluid and
not be "too idealistic". The staff is kept lean and expertise (both
internal and external) are brought in as needed.
The attitudes of the rest of the Company B does not affect the
acquisition decision-making. Since Company B approaches the
candidate with the expectation that personnel changes will be made
during the consolidation, almost all aspects of the process are kept
secret. Company B believes for the most part that talent has to be
infused into the companies that it acquires. Company B also believes
that its decisions are not affected by its shareholders at this
stage.
After the indepth analysis of the selling Company and alongwith
the negotiations between the two parties, Company B also sends
operating and other staff to research in situ the various aspects of
the selling Company's business such as facilities, manufacturing,
sales, etc. The typical duration is a 1-2 day visit by each
functional individual or team. Qualitative, independent reports are
submitted by each team member, and these are factored into the
recommendations to the CEO for every company that the CEO has
approved as a potential acquisition candidate. "Gut-feel" forms a
large part of the recommendations and assessments at this stage.
Company B's perspective on smaller acquisitions has been to
utilize (Company B) operating managers in various disciplines for the
overall acquisition. The larger acquisitions tend to be driven
largely by financial considerations and deal structuring (Investment
Bankers being key).
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On a few occassions, if the scope of the acquisition is very
large (financially) then "joint-venture" agreements are entered into
with the selling party.
Typically, the use of a third-party is dependent on the
situation concerned. An external consultant was used in the
acquisition of two small electronics materials firms. The consultant
served "to introduce" the two parties and bring them together. Such
an approach is rare for Company B. On another occasion, a common
Director on the Board of Company B and another company suggested the
latter's acquisition by Company B. The preliminaries in terms of
understanding the other management were dispensed with and this
company was acquired within a week of the initiation, with only one
plant visit and a breakfast meeting. These and other instances
indicate that Company B may be in a hurry to acquire and get its
Special Materials Program running viably as quickly as possible.
The "lack of proper homework" (unlike Company A) is manifest in the
acquisition of certain companies and the failure to acquire others
in the areas of Magnetic oxides, Gallium-Arsenide and
Semi-conductors. Exhaustive homework prevailed in successful
acquisitions in epitaxial devices and other joint-ventures.l8
Typical motivations of the seller that were exploited by
Company B in the negotiations included:
- a desire to cash in
- the lack of resources to meet the capital requirements of an
expanding business.
- a "distress" sale
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- the desire to participate in the industry (backward or
forward integration).
A key differentiating factor in Company B's strategy is the use
of outside technical consultants from academia, as opposed to
strictly industrial consultants. The technological drive and the
need to be at the forefront of all activity is the key behind
utilizing academics to help focus the search for suitable acquisition
candidates. The use of investment bankers is very limited.
Time is not a critical variable though there is the under-
current that the Special Materials Program has to be of a certain
size by a certain time frame. However, the indications are that
Company B's acquisition thrust accelerates very rapidly after the
initial contact is made and expectations of consummating the
acquisition are positively reinforcing.
4. LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA
The main thrust in this chapter was a descriptive report of the
Acquisition Process at Company A and Company B. The primary short-
coming of the process description of Company B was the reluctance of
senior management to "open-up fully" on specific acquisitions. Bits
and pieces of information were provided during the course of the
interviews themselves. The other major shortcoming was the inability
to get operating line executives (both at Company A and Company B) to
voice their perspectives on the Acquisition Process thereby diluting
somewhat the strength of the findings.
The major strength was that key individuals associated with
almost every recent acquisition of both companies were interviewed.
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The reports are, therefore, essentially correct in generalities and
most of the specifics; however, they do not have the input of key
line executives most intimately impacted by the acquisition decision.
The final chapter has several purposes in mind, central to
which is the analysis of information laid out in this chapter using
the framework proposed in Chapter 2 and the available evidence in
Chapter 1. Further research directions are also hinted that are
vitally needed to better understand the process perspective in
acquisitions.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Chairman of Company A quoted in 1977 shareholder's report.
2. Ibid.
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9. Business Week and Electronic News articles in 1984 on the
selection of a new President at Company A.
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17. Interview with in-house consultant at Company B.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS AND GENERALIZATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyzes the Acquisition Process at Companies A
and B. Similarities and differences are explored. The general
questions raised in Chapter 2 alongwith the available research
evidence in Chapter 1 are used to study the impediments in the
process at both Companies.
While there is no specific model to work with, the aim of this
chapter is to look for patterns of generality given the field data.
Commonalities between the field data and available information on the
Acquisition Process are construed as the more generalizable aspects.
Some of the differences between Compan.ies A and B are minor, others
are quite obvious. It is understood however, that a sample of only
two companies is an obvious limitation to the conclusions that can
be drawn.
Finally, to have a firm handle on the Aquisition Process
across corporations, the chapter suggests the need for in-depth study
of many more acquisitive companies. The overall message is that
apart from a strategic and organizational bias, acquisitive companies
differ in their "process bias" and that they understand in varying
degrees what the Process entails in an a-priori sense.
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2. ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS IN COMPANIES A AND B
a. A Note on Corporate Goals
Well-articulated objectives or goals exist to varying extents
in any acquisition decision process and this is manifest in both
Companies A and B. According to Drucker,l "....objectives are
needed in every area where performance and results directly and
vitally affect the survival and prosperity of the business". Both
Company A and B have had an evolving corporate strategy - in the case
of A a strategic redirection over a 5-10 year period; in the case of
B a relatively recent 2 year transition period. However, while
corporate goals are firm in the Company A psyche, they have yet to
permeate into Company B's organization. The conclusion is that an
acquisitive company may help itself by defining its goals clearly in
an a-priori sense.
b. The Role of the CEO
There are very strong and aggressive CEOs in both organiza-
tions. In terms of Table 1-2 on page 13, the operating mode for the
CEOs can be construed as "active". However, there is a difference in
the "delegation" of responsibility. There is no formal Corporate
Development Department in Company B. The Special Materials program
has several senior executives, each of whom works on acquisitions
alongside his other responsibilities. A full time in-house
consultant assists in seeking acquisition candidates. The CEO has
his own acquisition candidate database and list of preferred
criteria. The end result appears to be a "political consensus" about
which acquisition candidate to actively pursue. Only such "suitable"
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candidates come up to the CEO for approval and he himself cross-
references them with his own notions and ideas.
In contrast, the role of the VP-A is unique at Company A. The
acquisition decisions are taken in a delegated mode and the CEO
"steps in" at about the time the acquisition candidate is "serious"
about selling the company.
In both cases, the CEOs have made a strong commitment to the
program and closely track the program to ensure that it is in tune
with their overall strategy. This is espoused by Mace and
Montgomery2 who suggest that, "....(even though staff and line
groups have significant contributions to make) the leadership and
drive must come from the chief operating man or his representative
with his support".
The role of the Corporate Board (and Group Boards) in Company
A appear to be stronger than that of Company B. The independent
commitment of the Board is crucial to the success of any acquisition
mode.3
By Power's4 definition of decision-process categories (pages
16-17 of this thesis) it can be said that both CEOs and their staffs
follow a rational, analytic decision process. Impulsive, presold or
indecisive decision-making seems unlikely to aid success given the
direction of the two companies.
c. A Graphical Construct of the Players Involved
Exhibit 4-1 compares and contrasts the main players involved in
the Acquisition Process. Contrary to popular opinion (as Chapter 1
suggests), the role of investment bankers and external consultants
-84-
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are minimal or even eschewed by both companies, suggesting that
Mergers and Acquisitions may well proceed without their aid (at all
times and in all instances). This exhibit uses the framework
suggested by Jemison and Sitkin.5
One of the gaps in both companies is the lack of participation
of operating line management earlier in the Acquisition Process,
though Company B seemed to show a better "track-record" in this
respect. Their involvement seems to be solely to help analyze the
acquired company after successful negotiations have been conducted.
In the case of Firm Al, a number of compatability problems were
discovered after it became a part of Company A due, perhaps, to the
fact that operating managers were not involved earlier in the
process. The general lesson here appears to be that even though
acquisitions are very secretive processes privy to only the very top
management and their staff, the inclusion of key operating managers
at the time strategic analysis is taking place or key acquisition
ideas are being developed may prevent operational and integration
problems later.
d. Process-Based Impediments
The four process-based impediments suggested by Jemison and
Sitkin6 were defined in Chapter 1. Their sphere of influence
during the Acquisition Process is shown in Exhibit 4-2. The specific
impediments in the process at Companies A and B are shown in this
exhibit.
Generally, the amount of activity segmentation in Company A is
not much of a problem because of the unique role of the VP-A as an
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"initiator, expediter and integrator". The absence of any one such
specific individual in Company B may be a cause for concern (even
here some senior person in the Special Materials program takes
responsibility for the acquisition at least through the strategic
analysis phase). The problem with Company B is that various senior
personnel in the Special Materials Program are working on different
acquisition modes thereby implicitly thrusting the integrator's role
on the CEO, for which he may not have the time since he too is
thinking acquisition strategy for Company B as a whole. It is true
that both companies value "strategic fit" stronger than
"organizational fit", though Company A in its quest for "technology
and people" may be giving (relative to Company B) a lot of weight to
organizational issues also. Company B looks towards putting its own
people into managing acquireO companies and hence "strategic fit"
issues reign paramount. The absence of an individual such as the
VP-A (having a multi-disciplinary, global perspective) may cause the
wrong organization to be acquired by Company B for the right reasons.
One advantage of the limited use of external consultants and
investment bankers is that organizational issues may be given more
prominence than otherwise possible. This is because these external
players tend to concentrate mostly on "strategic fit" issues.
Escalating Momentum of the Acquisition Process is not affected
by any of the conventional reasons such as the presence of fee-based
investment bankers, commitment of the CEO to complete every deal that
is started, etc. Rather the problem here lies in the response to the
Corporate Strategy in both cases. Company A's strategic redirection
has made it "acquire for the sake of acquiring" to a certain extent,
-88-
as fast as possible (alongwith divestitures of mature businesses).
This has resulted in a set of non-integrated "stand-alone" businesses
more in keeping with a conglomerate's identity. Company B's strategy
of pulling in businesses into its Special Materials Program has been
more cautious; however, the lack of suitable direction (in terms of
what it wants specifically) may be making this company acquire faster
than it can assimilate - certain deals for instance, were consummated
in a matter of days without an adequate "Process" being put through
the paces. Also, Company B has been burnt in the past because it did
not move fast enough in one of its acquisitions and a selling company
used its bid "as a prod" to get a third party to move in and acquire
it. Hence, escalating momentum may be an impediment to the process
in both Companies.
Not much was revealed about the negotiation strategy during the
meetings between the acquiring company (A or B) and the selling
company. It can be conjectured that Expectational Ambiguity should
be less of a problem for Company A because it expects to run the
newly acquired Company more as a "stand-alone" during the short-term
after the acquisition. Company B wishing to integrate at once after
the acquisition (and possibly displace acquired top management) may
have "more to hide" during the negotiations, thereby setting up a
potential problem for the future.
One of the negatives with Company A during the first few years
of its strategic redirection was the heavy-handed application of its
systems on the Companies it acquired. As mentioned before this form
of Management Systems Misapplication resulted in poor integration and
loss of key managers thereby diluting the efficiency of the acquisi-
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tions. Over time, once this registered in the CEO's psyche and the
collective Company A mentality, the accent changed to keeping
acquisitions at arm's length during the short-term and allowing them
to function on their ow-n. In point-of-fact, the various Groups
themselves are different from each other in terms of Management
Systems.
There is every indication that Company B may not understand
this well enough and that managerial arrogance7 may be a chronic
problem. The presumptions of "subsidiary ineffectiveness" may well
be prevalent here, even if the unique capabilities of the acquired
company is apparent. The absence of key line operating managers in
the pre-acquisition phase compounds the problem because the
"perceived" strengths and/or shortcomings of the acquired company
cannot be better evaluated and understood earlier in the process.
In general, it appear, as though both Company A and B may not
be "aware" of process-based impediments in general. Consequently,
there are no mechanisms for either company to ask mid-way through
the process:
Are we going too fast? or have we thought out the effect the
imposition of our systems will have on the firm that we are
contemplating acquiring? or is our negotiating position
unambiguous to the extent that it will not create major
"headaches" later? or are too many people involved in the
Acquisition Process? Is it being coordinated well?
A final point concerns the "you're damned if you do and you're
damned if you don't" scenario surrounding Company A's acquisition
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strategy. The stand-alone philosophy is good but eventually the
company wishes to have integrated businesses either into the Factory
Automation area or Defense. However, they do not have a plan for
integration in place for fear of alienating subsidiary divisions and
losing key personnel in the short-term.
e. Other "Framework" Comparisons
It is clear that the psychological underpinnings of the
acquisition drive in Company A and B lay in the "fear of being in
stagnant, mature businesses". Both strategic redirections came from
a need to change fundamentally or to become caught in rapid
obsolesence and declining margins.
Another similarity in the two processes lies in the choice of
the physical location as a factor in the process dynamics between
the acquiring firm and the selling company (for both Companies A and
B). This is summarized in Exhibit 4-3. The sequence is crucial to
the actual "love-making" and the development of rapport between the
interested parties.
Timely signals according to both Companies A & B, are very
crucial to prevent misunderstandings. For example, if the CEO of
the selling company suggests that he will call on a certain day and
does not (without explanation), then there is a good chance that he
is reconsidering or there is another interested party waiting in the
wings. Timely Communication via memos, telephone calls and letters
are considered strong motivations and "enhancers" of positive
understanding between the parties involved. Both Companies appear to
understand this fact. The VP-A of Company A appeared to be
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especially sensitive to intra-company and inter-company
correspondence; His preferred approach was "verbal" communication
with the selling company.
It was difficult to judge the personal motivations underlying
the actions of the acquisition staff. No clear-cut need for personal
advancement within the company was seen. The ages of the senior
acquisition staff varied between 55-65. Personal risk issues seemed
minimal.
Neither company seemed to have a preconceived process plan-of-
action, though the process itself was formal in Company A and not-so-
formal in Company B.
Both companies endorsed the idea that the process should be
kept secret for fear of publicity (which would affect the stock price
of a puDlic company) or sending the wrong signals to personnel in the
other company. Intra-company attitudes outside of upper management,
were considered nebulous and not important enough to affect the
acquisition process. In the words of the Senior VP of Company B, "If
they don't like it, they can leave....".
3. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Admittedly the sample size of two companies does not lend
itself very well for generalizations on the Acquisition Process.
There are however, several process-based issues in the theory that
are reinforced by the findings in Companies A and B. That the
process may be fraught with impediments cannot be questioned. The
only question open to doubt is whether we can automatically predict
acquisition success or failure from the understanding of the process
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variables. This is difficult because of the lack of methods that
break up the relative impacts of strategic, organizational and
process variables on an acquisition's outcome. Also, not all of the
"process" questions and issues raised in Chapter two were necessarily
explored or answered in this study, though most of them came up in
the description and subsequent analysis.
One of the future requirements is that more research needs to
be done on several companies to build up the "descriptive"
literature. This will help to make the prescriptive literature more
useful, as "generalizations" multiply due to the larger body of
in-depth evidence.
This study can be strongly enhanced, therefore, by a concerted
effort to study the Acquisition Process in more companies. The end-
result may be a better understanding of whether or not strategic fit
and organizational fit issues have to be complemented by a "process
bias", for the acquisition to qualify as a success. A firm handle
on process variables and their relative (perhaps quantifiable)
impacts would go a long-way in reducing the "residual" uncertainty
that prevails in acquisition decision-making.
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CHAPTER 4
FOOTNOTES
1. Drucker, P. F., Practice of Management, New York: Harper and
Row, 1954, pp. 65.
2. Mace, M. L. and Montgomery, Jr. G. G., Management Problems of
Corporate Acquisitions, Graduate School of Business
Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1962, p. 75.
3. Mueller, R. K., Metadevelopment: Beyond the Bottom Line,
Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1977, pp. 11-27.
4. Power, D. J., "Biases and Problems in Mergers and Acqusitions
Decision Processes," College of Business and Management,
University of Maryland, October 1984.
5. Jemison, D. B. and Sitkin, S. B., "Hidden Barriers to
Acquisition Success," Research Paper Series No. 775, Graduate
School of Business, Stanford University, October 1984.
6. Jemison, D. B., and Sitkin, S. B., "Corporate Acquisitions - A
Process Perspective," Research Paper Series No. 732 (Revised),
Grauate School of Business, Stanford University, September 1984.
7. Jemison and Sitkin, Footnote No. (5), Ibid.
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